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Behavior in real space is regulated by three
sorts of constraints.' Law is just one of these three
constraints. Law tells individuals not to deduct
more than 50% of the cost of business meals from
their income tax; it tells corporations not to resist
unionization; it tells police not to coerce confes-
sions from suspects. In this way, we say, law regu-
lates.
But not only law regulates. Social norms also
regulate. Norms are a second sort of constraint.
Norms say I can buy a newspaper, but cannot buy
a friend. They frown on the racist's jokes, and are
unsure about whether a man should hold a door
for a woman. In far more contexts of our life
than law, norms constrain behavior. Norms, in
this sense, too, regulate.
And finally there is (for want of a better word
just now) nature. 2 It is the third of these con-
straints, and it too regulates. That I can not see
through walls is a constraint on my ability to
snoop. That I can not read your mind is a con-
straint on my ability to know whether you are tell-
ing me the truth. That I can not lift large objects
is a constraint on my ability to steal. Nature, in
these ways, constrains behavior. Nature, in this
sense, regulates.
These all are constraints on behavior. But how
each constraint achieves its effect is different.
Law and norms achieve their effects through the
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I Or at least three sorts of constraints. I am not claiming
that there are no other constraints. Psychology or the mar-
ket, for example, are constraints which are related to these
three primary constraints in complex ways.
2 By "nature" I don't mean constraints that are not man
threat of ex post punishment - law threatening
centralized punishment (police, prosecutors, and
courts), norms threatening decentralized punish-
ment (neighbors and busybodies). But nature
achieves its effect more directly. One doesn't
choose not to see through a brick wall for fear of
the punishment that nature will visit upon such
an infraction. One simply cannot see through a
brick wall. One doesn't choose not to lift an ele-
phant for fear of the ex post sanction if one does.
One simply cannot lift an elephant. We live life
subject to the constraints of nature; we live life
choosing whether to obey the constraints of laws,
or norms.3
Most regulation talk focuses on law among
these regulating constraints. The reasons are not
surprising. Law is the most obvious regulatory
constraint. It is that regulatory constraint over
which we seem to have the greatest control. Law
seems most plastic: statutes make the law, and
statutes are written; judges interpret the law, and
judges could interpret differently. Both facts fo-
cus us on law as a regulator. Reformists of both
the right and the left ask how law can be made to
regulate better.
This last decade in legal scholarship has seen
this focus shift somewhat. The work of Ellickson
and others has drawn attention to how norms
might regulate.4 The question has been first, does
made. A better, if more clumsy construction, would be na-
ture and architecture. As the discussion will suggest, I mean
just to point to physical constraints in life, whether man
made or not. These are constraints that define a physical en-
vironment. Obviously some of such constraints are man
made; some not.
3 This is not to say that the constraints of nature cannot
be changed. The car blocking my driveway is a constraint in
the sense I mean here; obviously, however, that constraint
can be changed. Constraints of nature can be plastic or not,
just as constraints of law or norms can be plastic or not.
4 See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw:




law determine norms, and second, and if not,
then how do norms regulate, and what makes
them as they are. A surprisingly rich literature has
now grown up around this question, much of it
skeptical of the efforts of governments to regulate
or to affect norms,5 but little skeptical of the idea
that norms are real, and that norms are regulat-
ing.6
But modem legal scholarship has not thought
much about how nature regulates. We take na-
ture as we find it. There are important excep-
tions: Roberto Unger among critical legal schol-
ars developed a powerful language for thinking
about how what functions as nature regulates.7
Outside law, this is Michel Foucault's focus as
well." And historically, thought about how nature
regulates was quite pronounced - from the focus
of the framers on how geography would help de-
fine the ideal republic,9 to the attention that ar-
chitects in France paid to the design of public
streets as a way to break up the resistance.10 But
these examples aside, our modern attention
within law to how nature regulates has been quite
thin. For the most part, we take nature as given,
assume norms are unmanageable, and then ask,
how much, or how should, law regulate?
This traditional order is about to change. It is
about to invert. We are entering an age where the
most important questions will not be how law con-
strains, but how nature should constrain. We are
entering a time when the most difficult questions
are not the questions of how far law should go,
but how far nature can be made to support law.
When the questions are not what norms there are,
but how far nature can be made to make norms as
they should be. Our focus is about to shift from
the most obvious locus of self-conscious, and ac-
tivist regulation, to the least obvious locus of self-
conscious and activist regulation; from a focus on
the direct constraints of law, to the indirect con-
straints that law is able to effect.
Cyberspace will effect this shift. My aim in this
short essay is to suggest how. I begin with a sketch
of two kinds of regulation (what I call direct and
5 See id. (this was Ellickson's implicit view); cf Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norns and Social Roles, 96 CoLum. L. Rrv.
903 (1996) (stating that government has a large role in norm
management).
6 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
7 See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK (Cambridge Univ. Press) (1987).
indirect). Both are regulations, but my argument
will be that the second, indirect regulation, is
about to become something much more signifi-
cant. Indirect regulation is about to become
more significant both because direct regulation
will become less effective, and because the tech-
nologies of indirect regulation will become more
effective. Or again, the regulatory return from di-
rect regulation is about to fall, while the return
from indirect regulation will rise quite dramati-
cally.
This will lead then to a second aim of this essay,
more directly trained on Mr. Corn-Revere's chap-
ter of the book that is the subject of this confer-
ence. 1 His work is an embrace of a kind of free
speech libertarianism. This argument goes some-
thing like this: We have entered a time when the
"culture of regulation" is strong. It manifests itself
a wide range of areas, most forcefully, and prob-
lematically, in the area of content regulation of
speech. Traditional protections against such con-
tent regulation have yielded to a siren: that this
space, at this time, is different. Traditional pro-
tections have checked out, while we find our bear-
ings in this new age. But we should move immedi-
ately back to the world where speech was
unregulated, or at least to where regulations of
content were exceptionally rare. That is the world
we have left, Corn-Revere argues, and it is the
world to which we should return.
There is much in this picture of libertarianism
that is attractive. There is much that resonates
with our constitutional past. But I want to argue
that the picture is incomplete, and the distinction
the first section draws between direct and indirect
regulation will suggest why. This incompleteness,
some have argued, was always present. It is about
to become unavoidable. And once we complete
what libertarianism leaves out, much of the "regu-
lation" that Corn-Revere attacks turns out to be
regulation that the libertarian should embrace.
This, in turn, will teach us something about liber-
tarianism, and something about the nature of
what regulation is becoming.
8 See, e.g., MICHEL FouCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
(Vintage Books) (1977).
9 Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (how geography
can help to define the ideal republic).
10 See DAVID H. PICKNEY, NAPOLEON III AND THE REBUILD-
ING OF PARIS (1958).
11 ROBERT CORN-REVERE, RATIONALES & RATIONALIZA-
TIONS ch. 1 (1997).
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I. REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE
I said at the start that behavior in real space is
regulated by three sorts of constraints (law,
norms, and nature) and that the way law and
norms regulate is different from the way that na-
ture regulates.
Behavior in cyberspace is regulated in just the
same way:
* First, law regulates behavior in cyberspace.
Copyright law, defamation laws, and obscenity
laws all continue to threaten ex post sanction for
the violation of some legal right. How well, or
how efficiently, is a separate question. In some
cases more efficiently, in some cases not. But
whether better or not, law continues to threaten
an expected and negative return, and this in ways
not much differently from real space. Legisla-
tures enact; 12 prosecutors threaten;1 3 courts con-
vict.14
* Second, norms regulate behavior in cyber-
space: talk about democratic politics in the
<alt.knitting> newsgroup, and you open yourself
to flaming; "spoof' someone's identity in a MUD,
and you might find yourself toaded; talk too
much in a discussion list, and you're likely to be
placed on a common bozo filter. In each case,
there is a set of understandings that constrain be-
havior in this space, again through a threat of ex
post (though decentralized) sanctions.
* Third and finally, an analog to nature, code,
regulates behavior in cyberspace. The code, or
the software that makes cyberspace as it is, consti-
tutes a set of constraints on how one can behave
12 The ACLU lists 11 states that passed Internet regula-
tions in 1995 and 1996. (visited Apr. 22, 1997) <http://
www.aclu.org/ issues/cyber/censor/stbills.html#bills>.
13 See, e.g., Minnesota Attorney General Office's In-
ternet Policy, (visited Apr. 22, 1997) <http://
www.state.mn.us/ebranch/ ag/memo.txt>.
14 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g,
1996 US Dist Lexis 8435 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
15 For example, online services such as America Online.
16 USENET postings can be anonymous.
17 Web browser's make this information available, both
in real time, and archived in a cookie file.
18 Web browsers also permit users to turn this tracking
feature off.
19 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a program to encrypt
messages. SeeJason Kerben, Comment, TheDilemma for Future
Communication Technologies: How to Constitutionally Dress the
Crypto-Genie, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 125 (Winter 1997).
20 See Comments of Ambassador David Aaron, (visited
Apr. 22, 1997) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov /aaron.htm> (En-
cryption, for example, is illegal in some international con-
in cyberspace. The substance of these constraints
vary, but they are experienced as conditions on
one's access to cyberspace. In some places, one
must enter a password before one gains access;' 5
in other places, one can enter whether identified
or not.16 In some places, the transactions that one
engages produce traces that link the transactions
(the mouse droppings) back to the individual;17
in other places, this link is achieved only if one
wants.18 In some places, one can select to speak a
language that only the recipient can hear
(through encryption);19 in other places, encryp-
tion is not an option.2 0 The code or software or
architecture or protocols set these features; they
are features selected by code writers; they con-
strain some behavior by making other behavior
possible, or impossible. They too are regula-
tions. 21
In this sense, then, law, norms and code regu-
late cyberspace just as law, norms and nature (or
what I call "real space code") regulate real space.
But there is an important difference between
these two regimes. In real space, constraints are
changed by changing law; in cyberspace, con-
straints will be changed by changing code.2 2 This
will follow because of two features of these two dif-
ferent worlds: First: In real space, it is law that is
plastic; in cyberspace, it is code that is plastic.
And second: In real space, it is relatively hard to
escape the constraints of law; in cyberspace, it is
much easier.2 3 The effect of both differences will
be to shift the locus of regulatory change from law
to code. In real space, law is at center stage, and
texts).
21 Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Mak-
ing in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1996); David Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996).
22 This is not the architecture of the net as is it right now.
Today, rich code regulation is not possible. This is, however,
the direction that I believe the code is moving. See Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 45 STAN. L. RiEv. 1403 (1996).
23 The argument that law is relatively less effective in
cyberspace than in real space is well known, and in my view,
too strongly made. It is true that, given architectures of the
space as they exist just now, law is at a disadvantage. But it
doesn't follow from this that law couldn't force code to be
structured such that law would be more effective. But I put
to one side the question of how effective law could be made.
It is still true that code will be relatively more effective, or
efficient. And it is this comparative advantage that I want to
consider. See David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An
Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3.
Par. 4 (1995) (on the weakness of law in code space).
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code is an afterthought. In cyberspace, the game
is code. Law is a side-show.
This difference is more than a difference in effi-
ciency. The question is not just which achieves a
collective end more cheaply. The difference is
also a difference in how law and code regulate.
Law (and norms) regulates mediately, through
the threat of ex post sanction, while code, in con-
structing a social world, regulates immediately.
We live life subject to the code, as we live life sub-
ject to nature. Just as we do not choose whether
to see through a wall or not, we don't choose
whether to enter America Online without giving
our password. Superman might choose whether
to see through a wall; and hackers might be able
to choose whether to enter AOL with a password.
But we are neither supermen nor hackers (if such
a distinction exists). We live life subject to the
constraints of code, however (and by whomever)
these constraints have been set.
Code then regulates then as nature regulates.
It has the power of nature and is experienced as
nature. And yet, code is more plastic than nature.
It functions as a kind of naturalized politics. It is a
way to codify political choice, or a way to more
quickly move political choice into the back-
ground. It is a mechanic for social construction -
for it is obviously a construction, and it plainly de-
fines the social world that lives life subject to it.
But it constructs a social world differently from
how norms, or law, constructs a social world. Not
necessarily worse, or better, just differently.
This difference forces a choice on us that in
real space we ordinarily ignore. If behavior is reg-
ulated by these three sorts of constraints, then in
principle we could substitute one constraint for
another - substitute, for example, a law constraint
for a norm constraint; or a norm constraint for a
code constraint; or a code constraint for a law
constraint, and so on. With real space regulation,
because norms and real space code are relatively
nonplastic, we don't think much about this trade-
off.2 4 In cyberspace, however, the trade-off is una-
24 There are important exceptions. See, e.g., Eric A. Pos-
ner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonle-
gal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133
(1996) (examining the costs of trading norm constraints for
law constraints); See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (a theory of social justice predi-
cated upon a technology that could substitute code con-
straints for law constraints).
25 Johnson & Post, supra note 21.
voidable.
In cyberspace, because code is so plastic and so
powerful, and because law is so feeble and (on an
international scale) so rigid, code has a compara-
tive regulatory advantage over law. A gap in legal
regulation will therefore emerge, and code will fill
that gap. Structures of regulation get codified in
the architecture of the net, and these structures of
regulation entail important values choices.
Whether information will be kept private,
whether encrypted speech is allowed, whether an-
onymity is permissible, whether access is open and
free - these are all policy choices made by default
by a structure of code that has developed - una-
ware at times, and, generally, uncritically of the
politics that code entails.
Some argue that this shows that government
should simply get out of the way. That govern-
ment should let code regulate, and defer to its
regulations in this space.25 But this is quite un-
likely. We shouldn't expect government simply to
cede jurisdiction over cyberspace to Barlow-
types.26 Instead, government will shift to a differ-
ent regulatory technique. Rather than regulating
behavior directly, government will regulate indi-
rectly. Rather than making rules that apply to
constrain individuals directly, government will
make rules that require a change in code, so that
code regulates differently. Code will become the
government's tool. Law will regulate code, so that
code constrains as government wants.27
There are then two techniques for regulating
cyberspace - direct and indirect - and to-date,
governments have adopted both techniques.
Some laws regulate behavior directly. States, for
example, are making it a crime to utter fighting
words on the Internet, or making it a crime to
gamble on the Internet.28 But more and more
frequently, governments regulate indirectly, by
either requiring that code be modified in some
way to achieve a preferred primary behavior, or by
inducing norms governing cyberspace to favor a
preferred behavior. Some proposals embrace
26 See John Perry Barlow's, Declaration of Independence
for Cyberspace, (visited Apr. 22, 1997) <http://www.eff.
org/pub/Publications/JohnPerryBarlow/barlow_0296.
declaration>.
27 Another way to view this is law regulating norms, so
that norms constrain as government wants.
28 Minnesota, for example. See Minnesota Attorney
General Office's Internet Policy, supra note 13.
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both techniques. The government's White Paper
on Intellectual Property, for example, speaks of
law regulating differently, and of law regulating
norms, and code, so that norms and code regu-
late differently.29 But the trend, I suggest, will be
towards indirect regulation, an in the section that
follows, I give examples of how.
II. INDIRECTION IN CYBERSPACE
My claim so far has been simply descriptive.
I've distinguished among the constraints of law,
norms, and code, and I've distinguished between
the direct regulations of law, and the indirect reg-
ulation (by law) of law, and norms, and code.
This latter distinction we can represent graphi-
cally as in Figure 1: the three boxes represent the
three types of constraint that I have described. In
the center is the resulting constraint of the three.
Law, norms, and code each have a direct effect;
that effect is represented by the arrows within the
three boxes. But law can also have an effect on
code, or norms, represented by the arrows outside
the three boxes. The arrows outside represent in-
direct regulation; the arrows within, direct.
This topology maps real space regulation. It maps
cyberspace regulation as well. But its proportions
in cyberspace are quite different from its propor-
tions in real space. For again, the possibility of
regulation through code in cyberspace is far
greater than the possibility of regulation through
code in real space. And the possibility of regula-
29 The regulation of norms is through educational pro-
grams, that are designed to increase the stigma associated
with the theft of intellectual property. The regulation of
code is through laws that make code-breaking code illegal,
and through encouragement of the development of intellec-
tual property protecting code, such as encryption, or digital
signatures. See Bruce A. Lehman, The Report of the Working
tion through law in cyberspace is far less than in
real space.s 0 Thus cyberspace will make more sali-
ent questions about how code regulates, and
more critical questions about how law regulates
code.
For law now plainly regulates code. Consider
just three examples drawn from the work the last
two Congresses: Each aims to regulate cyberspace
indirectly, by regulating code directly:
A. Digital Telephony Act
The first examples is Congress' recent Digital
Telephony Act.3 1 As telephone networks have
moved from analog to digital, and as switching
technologies have moved from central switching
to distributed, this change (in the code regulating
networks) has had an important consequence for
law enforcement. No longer is there a predict-
able path through which a telephone call will
pass, and hence no longer is it an easy matter to
tap a phones on a digitally switched network.
This is so, at least, with one version of the archi-
tecture of a digitally switched telephone network.
Other versions of that architecture are less difficult
to tap. The architecture of telephone networks
could be designed either to make it "wire-tap ac-
cessible" or "wire-tap inaccessible." The differ-
ence is simply a choice of code. And whatever
code is chosen, plainly values of privacy or evasion
are implicated by the code.
The Digital Telephony Act is a choice about
those values. It required that telephone compa-
nies select a network architecture that facilitates
wiretapping. It required, that is, a code that facili-
tated the government's objective of being able to
tap when it had authority to tap. The government
chose this mode of regulation over another that
was certainly available - the government could,
that is, have simply increased punishments to
overcome the loss in enforcement ability. But its
choice was different, and this no doubt because of
the values at stake.
This is law regulating code. It is a regulation
Group on Intellectual Property Rights (U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office) Sept. 1995.
30 Johnson & Post, supra note 21.
31 Digital Telephony Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279. See also Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy, 69




designed to reduce the constraints that code
might create for law enforcement. Its indirect ef-
fect is therefore to improve law enforcement. But
it does that by modifying possible code based con-
straints on law enforcement. It selects a code that
distributes the burdens of code in a collectively
valued way.
B. Communications Deceny Act
The second example is the Communications
Decency Act. ("CDA")3 2 In the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Congress enacted restrictions
on the production of indecency on the net.
These restrictions are of a mixed sort. The
prohibitions of the CDA are really paired prohibi-
tions - there is, on the one hand, the banning of
indecent speech on the net, and, on the other
hand, the permission to speak indecently if one
implements a reasonably effective screening tech-
nology. The first part of this pair is direct regula-
tion - its a legal ban on primary conduct, backed
up by the threat of punishment; the second is in-
direct regulation - the definition of a safe haven
for indecent speech, implemented through code.
How then should we understand, or characterize,
the two parts combined?
In my view, we should read the two parts to-
gether as an indirect regulation of code. Like the
Digital Telephony Act, the statute in effect regu-
lates the architecture of the net. It mandates a
technology that facilitates discrimination based
on age. It is, in effect, a zoning statute.3 3 It says
that those who want to speak indecently must do
so in a particular space - behind electronic
screens. The statute is a jobs program for cyber-
screen technologies. If it were upheld, we can ex-
pect the code of cyberspace to be modified, to
better facilitate the government's aim to screen
indecency from kids.
C. The V-Chip
Also within the Telecommunications Act of
1996 was the V-chip regulation.3 4 Said Congress,
television manufacturers and media producers
32 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 230, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West Supp.
1996)).
33 This is now the government's argument in the ACLU
v. Reno case. See Brief for the United States, ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-511); see also Law-
must develop a technology to rate broadcasting
on television, so that individuals at home can
choose to block what they don't want to see. In
the most obvious sense imaginable, this too is an
indirect regulation through code. It says that tele-
visions must have built-in a code that facilitates
discrimination on the part of consumers of televi-
sion broadcasting. And it does this to advance the
aim of the government - that parents be empow-
ered to discriminate.
I find it interesting that this provision didn't
raise much constitutional concern, though just
why I think that I will defer for the moment.
What is important now is just to see the relation-
ship between the CDA and the V-chip. Both are
code regulations. They both mandate a certain
architecture of code. They both mandate that ar-
chitecture as a way to facilitate discrimination on
the part of the consumer. Both aim, that is, to
reduce the costs of discrimination on the part of
the consumer. The CDA mandates just one di-
mension of discrimination - based on age. The V-
chip, in principle, mandates a technology with an
open ended array of discriminations - based on
violence, or sex, or family values. Or again, the
CDA codifies just one type of discriminatory de-
fault, different from where it is just now (it codi-
fies that is the default that children can't get ac-
cess to indecency), while the V-chip codifies an
open ended list of discriminatory defaults.
These three acts by the 103d and 104th Con-
gress, then, are three examples of indirect regula-
tion through the regulation of code. How should
we evaluate such regulation? Is code regulation
more suspect than law regulation? Or more
pointedly, can libertarians be as consistent in
their opposition to code regulation as they are to
law regulation? Is all of this just "regulation" and
therefore all subject to the same anti-regulatory
libertarian attack?
That is the sense one gets from Mr. Corn-Re-
vere's chapter. It sketches a picture of regulation
as disease. "Censorship is contagious," Mr. Corn-
Revere writes, and we have apparently caught the
contagion. We were promised, in the mid-1980s,
"a full recovery" from this disease, but now all
rence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
L.J. 869, 883-95 (1996).
34 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 551, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West
Supp. 1996)).
186 [Vol. 5
THE CONSTITUTION OF CODE
signs threaten a relapse. If the "First Amendment
is the immune system," then, Mr. Corn-Revere
warns, this "culture of regulation" threatens free
society as "the AIDS crisis" threatens the body.
Cyberspace, we are told, is becoming a new me-
dium "to spread the disease."
This is scary stuff, but I wonder whether the lib-
ertarian should be scared. I wonder more pre-
cisely whether a libertarian can that think that all
such regulation is disease. I want to argue that he
or she cannot: That some of the regulation that
Mr. Corn-Revere attacks is regulation that the lib-
ertarian should embrace. Or alternatively, that if
there is reason to attack, it is not reason grounded
in libertarianism.
My argument follows from the distinction that I
have drawn between direct and indirect regula-
tion. We can see the point by focusing on the last
two examples of regulation that I described above
- the CDA and the V-chip. In the first, Congress
is mandating one dimension of discrimination in
the architecture of the net; in the second, Con-
gress is mandating an open ended list of discrimi-
nations in the architecture of the net. In the
CDA, it is requiring that the net screen by age; in
the V-chip, it is mandating that the v-net screen by
violence, and sexuality, and any number of other
attributes yet to be determined. The first is a very
simple, maybe crude discrimination; the second
has the potential to be quite sophisticated and
subtle. (On the Web, some versions imagine pro-
grams being rated by competing rating organiza-
tions, and viewers then able to select the rating
system they want imposed35 ).
But whether simple or sophisticated, the impor-
tant point is this: That both regulations are regula-
tions that increase consumer power. Both are regula-
tions of the defaults of the net, and given fairly
uncontroversial assumptions about what "most
people want," both have the effect of giving cyber-
space users greater control by setting the defaults
to the choice most would select. The CDA does
this by setting a default against access to adults
sites; that default increases the control of consum-
ers, assuming that most would want to block ac-
35 See, for example, the PICS System (last visited May 6,
1997) <http://www.W3.org/pub/www/pics>.
36 One question not pressed in the present litigation is
whether a parent has the right to make indecent material
available to his or her kid, the CDA notwithstanding. A plain
reading of the statute says not, but one might imagine that
an implied parental exception is understood here. On prin-
cess to these sites; for most, then, want to have ac-
cess blocked, but those who want to give their kids
access would, presumably, still have that right.3 6
The V-chip does this even more. It establishes a
filtering device that gives views increased control
over what kinds of television is displayed on their
television. The result of this will be a broader
range of television broadcasting, and a greater
ability for viewers to select what they wanted to
see.37
To the extent that these regulations simply in-
crease consumer choice, why should a libertarian
oppose them? Without these regulations, it would
be harder for consumers to get what they want;
with these regulations, it becomes easier. Without
these regulations, cyberspace is an undifferenti-
ated, unzoned world; with these regulations, indi-
viduals can navigate the space without exposure
to what they don't want to see. These are regula-
tions that rationalize the space, in the way a map
rationalizes real space. They are about facilitating
individual power, against forces the individual
can't otherwise control. They are freedom en-
hancing, not freedom reducing.
The libertarian might respond, however, by dis-
tinguishing between the regulations that code
yields, and the regulation of code. She might say,
that is, that it is OK that code regulates; but not
OK for government to regulate the code. The
problem is regulation, whether direct, or indirect,
not constraint.
This view might make sense in a relatively stable
environment, where it expresses a mildly con-
servative view against further regulation of given,
and constant, constraints. But it makes no sense
in a context where the constraint themselves have
undergone a radical change.
Imagine that a virus (to continue Corn-Revere's
metaphor) wiped out the human race's ability to
act according to social norms - that overnight, we
simply lost that sense of what was appropriate so-
cially, and the attitude to conform to that view. In
this world, one of the three constraints that I have
described (law, norms, and code) has disap-
peared, and the question is whether law, or code,
ciples analogous to the decision in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958), we might believe Congress would have to speak
more clearly if it intended to invade parental rights like this.
37 See J. M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foun-
dations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DuKE L. J. 1131 (1996); cf




should fill the gap created by this virus. Should
new structures compensate for the collapse in
constraint brought about by this elimination of
the constraint of norms?
My sense here is that the conservative would
support regulation aimed at reestablishing the
balance of constraint that existed prior to the in-
fection. And that rather than viewing this regula-
tion as disease (as again Mr. Corn-Revere's essay
does), he might view this regulation as therapy for
a disease. It would be regulation aimed at restora-
tion, not regulation aimed at change.
If you buy this picture with respect to the virus,
then I think you are not far from the picture with
respect to cyberspace today. For just as my hypo-
thetical virus was imagined to erase the con-
straints of norms, so too should we see cyberspace
today as a place that has erased the constraints of
code (meaning real space code). For think again
about the regulation of, say, porn - not the regu-
lation against the consumption of porn, but the
real world regulations that exist now to assure that
porn is not distributed to kids.
Some of that regulation comes from law - not
much, but some. Some communities, for exam-
ple, pass laws that ban the sale of porn to kids;
some pass laws that require IDs before porn can
be sold; some pass laws that require the presence
of a parent before a kid can see porn.38
But most of the regulation of the sale of porn to
kids comes from norms, and code: Norms that
regulate sellers of porn (economic interests not
withstanding), and code that makes it hard for a
kid to hide his age, or hard for a kid to travel to
the area of a city where porn is sold, or hard for a
kid to fake an ID that would make it possible for
porn to be sold to him. These constraints of
norms and code combine in real space with the
constraints of law, and constitute a regime of reg-
ulation that limits the sale of pornography to kids.
Cyberspace changed all that. There were still
the regulations of law, and let's assume there were
as well the regulations of norms. What changed,
however, was the regulation of code. Now, be-
cause a kid could easily hide his age, code didn't
facilitate discrimination in the sale of porn to
kids. And now, because it was easy to travel in
cyberspace, the code constraint of distance no
longer facilitated discrimination in the sale of
38 See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A
GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 189-206 (Univ. of Chicago
porn to kids. What cyberspace did - much as the
virus in my hypothetical does - was erase the con-
straints of code on the distribution of pornogra-
phy, and thereby erase constraints that facilitated
discrimination in the sale of pornography.
The CDA tries to rebuild part of this code. It
tries by requiring that the architecture of the
space reestablish some of the constraints of real
space, to facilitate discrimination in the distribu-
tion of porn. And given this reconstruction, it is
at least a question whether we should consider
this new regulation, or simply the re-establishment
of an old regime. For if this is the re-establish-
ment of a regime of constraint that existed before
cyberspace began, then a view that does not in
general oppose constraint needs a stronger argu-
ment to resist this sort of re-restraint. Put another
way, if the ground for libertarianism is a resistance
to new regulation, and if the regulation of the
CDA is nothing new, then something more is
needed to resist the CDA.
Whether one buys my argument about the CDA
or not, it should be clear that some regulation of
code is choice enhancing rather than choice disa-
bling. And so the question about this must be,
about what can the individual complain? Or
more directly, about what can the libertarian com-
plain?
III. COMPLAINTS ABOUT CHOICE
In the last section I argued that regulations like
the CDA and V-chip are regulations of code. And
I argued as well that the effect of these regulation
of code was to increase individual choice. These
were regulations that gave the individual more
power to exclude, by giving the individual more
power to filter. What principle of libertarianism
gives us a reason to resist such regulation?
My sense is that none does: That there is no
principle of libertarianism that would resist regu-
lations that enhance individual choice, for in my
read at least, libertarianism isjust that philosophy
aimed at maximizing the scope for individual
choice. If there is a reason then to resist regula-
tions such as the CDA, or V-chip, the reasons must
find their ground outside of libertarianism.
What would that ground be? I don't think we
have a well developed tradition for speaking of
Press) (1996). The ground for this regulation was affirmed
in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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such a regime. We have flashes of it within our
constitutional tradition, but these flashes have
been unified only in the work of academics. In
that domain, the tradition is the tradition that
Sunstein speaks of as Madisonian.39 It is a tradi-
tion that asserts a state interest to muck around
with individual choice about speech, so as to as-
sure a mix of speech in the speech market that
serves democratic ends.40 It is a tradition that re-
sists the principle of consumer sovereignty; a tra-
dition that considers the implied aggregation
from individual consumer choice just one possi-
ble aggregation of social preferences; 4 1 and that
therefore reserves a question about the alloca-
tions that are achieved by regimes that perfect in-
dividual choice. 42
From this perspective, there are obvious ques-
tions about the regime of choice that this code is
producing. My claim is that the code is develop-
ing to facilitate individual power to screen speech
automatically. This, I suggest, is something new.
The individual is not confronted with the speech,
and then forced to choose not to listen; the indi-
vidual instead programs her v-, or e-machine, and
that program does the screening for her. The sys-
tem becomes a faithful butler, answering the
door, and politely pushing the unwanted along. 43
And as the requirements for enabling filtering in-
crease, we can imagine that the sophistication of
this filtering will increase as well.
How should we think about such intelligent
agents? We have had analogs in American consti-
tutional history that might provide a clue. These
analogs were no doubt crude, but they functioned
in the same way. They were orders that screened
delivery of information on the basis of content.
And the question the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed in the three cases that have reviewed such
technologies was how broadly this screening
power could be extended or facilitated by the gov-
ernment. Or alternatively, what constitutional
principle might limit this power to screen.
The three cases that come closest to answering
39 CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH xvi-xviii (Free Press) (1993).
40 Id. at xviii.
41 Id. at 18-19.
42 See generally Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48
STAN. L. REv. 345 (1996) (arguing current urban policy
adopted by every level of American Government promotes
fragmentation of American cities, tends to isolate the poor,
and fosters suspicion because fewer Americans encounter
people whose cultures, values and opinions are different
this question raise as many questions as they an-
swer. The first was Lamont v. Postmaster General of
the United States.4 4 The question in Lamont was the
constitutionality of a statute that required the re-
cipient of communist mail sent from a foreign ad-
dress to indicate that he wanted to receive such
mail, by returning a post card sent to him by the
post office. If within twenty days, that card was
not returned, then it was presumed that the recip-
ient did not want to receive the mail, and that
mail, and all similar mail, would from that mo-
ment on not be delivered.4 5
The Court struck the statute, but the opinion
that give the reasoning its most salient twist is a
concurring opinion by Justice Brennan. 46 While
Brennan saw no problem in allowing the recipient
to request that no further mail from a particular
address be delivered, Brennan thought that re-
striction permissible only because the sender had
had, as it were, one bite at the apple. Even if the
individual by default didn't want to receive any
communist mail, the sender had a right, Bren-
nan's opinion suggests, to send at least one
message through the mail. After that one
message, the recipient could use the state to shut
off further communication; but before that one
chance, he could not.4 7
Brennan's reasoning is consistent with the sec-
ond opinion arguably relevant here - Rowan v.
United States Post Office.48 The issue in Rowan was a
regulation that permitted addressees to tell the
post-office to block the delivery of indecent mate-
rial in the mails. Parallel to the CDA, the statute
was defended on the same grounds as the CDA:
to protect children from this indecent material. 4 9
The question was whether this sort of protection
(of children) interfered too much with the rights
of adults.
The Court upheld the statute, but read it quite
narrowly. The individual, the Court held, could
block the receipt of material from a particular
mailer, but only because it was the individual mak-
ing the judgment about what was indecent, and
than their own).
43 See, e.g., NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 179
(Vintage Books) (1996).
44 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
45 Id. at 303-04.
46 Id. at 307.
47 Id. at 310.
48 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
49 Id. at 731-32.
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because it was that judgment that stopped the de-
livery, and because the decision was limited to a
particular mailer.5 0 The power was to shut off fur-
ther mailings from a particular sender; it could
not be expanded to a power to filter all mail of
the same kind.51 The state could not be used to
facilitate automatic filtering. The choice to filter
must be made, Brennan's argument suggests, by
the individual, on a per sender basis.
This disabling of government filtering gets its
strongest expression in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts Corp.52 The federal statute struck there pro-
hibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements
for contraceptives. The statute was defended
both because it protected the public against
speech most would find offensive, and because it
protected kids from speech that parents might
find indecent. The first ground was insufficient.
The second ground was too narrow for a statute
that regulated with this breadth. Said the Court:
"We [have] recognized the important interest in al-
lowing addressees to give notice to a mailer that they
wish no further mailings. . . But we have never held
that the government itself can shut off the flow of mail-
ings to protect those recipients who might potentially
be offended."5 3
The three opinions together support an argu-
ment that the government is constrained in its
power to aid individuals in their filtering of per-
missible speech. It can protect the right of indi-
viduals to filter; but only when the individual first
confronts what must be filtered. That burden, of
making that selection, must, this view argues, be
left with the individual. The evil here is govern-
mental facilitation of ex ante filtering, even where
the filtering is what a majority would want.54 As
Tribe puts it, "each householder must be left with
the right to decide what messages to receive; gov-
ernment cannot make this choice in gross."5 5
This view of the first amendment is inconsistent
with a technology of perfect filtering, or more
precisely, with indirect regulations that facilitate
perfect filtering. It is inconsistent with this kind
of indirect regulation, because the essence of this
view of the first amendment is that some imper-
50 Id. at 734, 737.
51 The Court rejected a reading of the statute which
would have allowed the Postmaster General to identify the
mail "similar" to that curtailed by the householder and to
curtail delivery of the similar mail as well. Id. at 732. Under
the Court's reading of the statute, the Postmaster General's
role is limited to the issuance of the prohibitory order, and
the prosecution for violation of the order. Id. at 738
fection is a public value. The government is lim-
ited in the aid it can give for shutting off a class of
otherwise permissible speech.
The essence of perfect filtering is that the re-
ceiver be able to turn off a class of otherwise per-
missible speech. Given the code regulating
speech now - given the technologies for screen-
ing speech now - that is quite difficult. The best
computers in the world cannot effectively screen
raw text, and they certainly cannot screen raw
video. Thus today, perfect ex ante filtering is im-
possible. There's no way perfectly to select what
one wants to see, while excluding what one
doesn't want to see, except by seeing something,
and then deciding not to see it again.
But a simple change in technology would
change all this. As Negroponte pointed out a few
years ago,5 6 the power to regulate content hangs
on whether there are labels attached to the con-
tent - whether, in other words, there is a digital
truth in labeling law. If speech were required to
carry such labels - accurately describing the con-
tent of such speech then very crude machines
could effect very sophisticated filtering. If all
transmissions were labeled, then very simple com-
puters could screen speech that doesn't match a
selected label: Very simple computers; or very
simple chips, or we could say, V-chips, for short.
Perfect and automatic ex ante filtering is in this
way facilitated by indirect regulations that require
labeling. This is just what the V-chip statute re-
quires directly, and what the CDA requires in ef-
fect. For the CDA, like the statute in Lamont, says
that the adult must take steps to connect to inde-
cent speech. And the V-chip, as the statute in
Rowan could have been read, requires a kind of
labeling of speech, that facilitates ex ante screen-
ing. Both, again, are technologies facilitating
choice, because both are technologies for facilitat-
ing perfect ex ante screening.
If we are to resist these technologies, my sugges-
tion is that the grounds for our resistance are not
libertarian. They are not grounds that affirm the
value of freedom of choice. They are instead
52 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
53 Id. at 72.
54 Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233, 262-72 (1975).
55 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 949
(2d ed. 1988).
56 NEGROPONTE, supra note 43, at 180 ("The bits about
the bits change broadcasting totally.").
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Madisonian grounds, to adopt Sunstein-speak,
that resist perfect choice in the name of some bet-
ter balance of speech.
My point is not so much to argue for these al-
ternative grounds. It is certainly not to predict
that the Court would follow them in interpreting
the First Amendment. It is instead to suggest an
incompleteness in a choice based critique of indi-
rect regulations of code. For if indirect regula-
tions of code are not choice disabling, but choice
enhancing, then an individual choice-based phi-
losophy has no grounds for resisting them. These
arguably are the effects of the current cyberspace
regulations. We need something more than liber-
tarianism to resist them.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have a well developed tradition for thinking
about direct regulation by law. We have a large
constitutional and statutory structure for testing
it, and limiting it. This structure arose in a con-
text where direct regulation was laws most effec-
tive tool: Where this was where the action was,
and where this was what regulation would be.
We are entering a time when direct regulation
by government will be one of the least important
modes of regulation; when the most important
regulations will be regulations that are less direct.
One question will then be how to carry from the
old context values important in the new. Or more
directly, how to limit, or constrain this indirect
regulation, to achieve the values that other limits
on governmental power are to yield.
This change will disorient us for a bit. It makes
sense that it will. We are not used to the power
that indirect regulation will offer; our intuitions
were built in a world where baselines were rela-
tively fixed. This suggests that we should gain our
bearings again before speaking too boldly.
Bold speaking is what I fear about the current
arguments of cyber-libertarians (such as the
ACLU, or EFF). They have carried over directly
real space arguments about direct regulation by
law; they haven't thought through indirect regula-
tion by code. They are pushing us to a world -
indeed they are encouraging it - where auto-
matic ex ante filtering is a feature of life. But I am
not so certain that this is a feature that will make
life better. And my sense is that before it gets en-
coded, we need to think more about what it would
mean.
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